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Abstract. The composition of vulnerabilities in attack scenarios has
been traditionally performed based on detailed pre- and post-conditions.
Although very precise, this approach is dependent on human analysis, is
time consuming, and not at all scalable. We investigate the NIST Na-
tional Vulnerability Database (NVD) with three goals: (i) understand
the associations among vulnerability attributes related to impact, ex-
ploitability, privilege, type of vulnerability and clues derived from plain-
text descriptions, (ii) validate our initial composition model which is
based on required access and resulting effect, and (iii) investigate the
maturity of XML database technology for performing statistical analy-
ses like this directly on the XML data. In this report, we analyse 27,273
vulnerability entries (CVE [1]) from the NVD. Using only nominal infor-
mation, we are able to e.g. identify clusters in the class of vulnerabilities
with no privilege which represent 52% of the entries.
Keywords: network vulnerabilities, attack scenarios, CVE, CVSS, XQuery,
XML database
1 Introduction
The combination of the elements vulnerability, reachability, and threat gives rise
to the risk of an attacker exploiting attack scenarios to reach targets, such as
valuable assets of an organization.
Vulnerabilities 1 are uncovered every day. This happens in part because
COTS (Commercial Off-The-Shelf) software components are not bug-free, and
worse, not even COTS producers know how vulnerable their products are [2].
Hence, vulnerabilities are discovered and corrected (i.e. patched) along the COTS
lifecycle. Apart from that, hackers have access to more and more resources such
as sophisticated tools (often available on the Internet) and hardware. As a con-
sequence, the chance of vulnerabilities occurring in a network and of attackers
finding a way to exploit them increases.
1 vulnerability [1] is “a mistake in software that can be directly used by a hacker to
gain access to a system or network”.
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Reachability became a demand, and organisations nowadays face the chal-
lenge of providing employees with access “all the time, from everywhere”. Thus,
organisations’ networks can never be isolated from the outside World. Addi-
tionally, it is common-sense that “a computer network is only as secure as its
weakest node” [3, Page 22]. Therefore, although valuable hosts are usually pro-
tected by sometimes several filtering barriers, reaching the less protected may
allow attackers to reach the more secure and valuable hosts.
Threat arises from a wide spectrum of attackers’ motivation: profit, fame and
sabotage [4,5]. Considering this diversity, it seems reasonable to assume that it
is likely that any organisation will be targeted by at least one class of attackers.
As a consequence, threat becomes a reality and can only be avoided by means
of protection.
In this report, we focus on dealing with the compositional aspect of vulnera-
bilities. As such, we assume that vulnerabilities have been detected by vulnera-
bility scanning tools, like Nessus [6], which report vulnerabilities found in hosts
in terms of the standard nomenclature CVE (further information in Section 3).
We assume the worst-case scenario where threat is constantly present, thus, vul-
nerabilities and reachability among hosts are essential ingredients to be tracked
in networks.
We investigate the NVD [7], maintained by the NIST [8], a repository of
known vulnerabilities used by security practitioners worldwide. Our aim is to
understand the database having in mind the following requirements for the vul-
nerability composition model:
– It should be based on generic rules,
– it should be viable to automation,
– it should be scalable,
– it should allow a binary decision for the ability of an attacker to move from
a compromised host to exploit a vulnerability in another reachable host, and
– it should be relevant in practice in terms of coverage of its elements on the
NVD.
1.1 Contribution
The contribution of this report is three-fold. First, we contribute by increas-
ing knowledge about the NVD, which is one of the most comprehensive (pub-
licly available) databases of vulnerabilities used in practice and reported by
academia (e.g. [9,10,11]). Second, we contribute by validating our composition
model, which is based on other researchers’ work [10,12], in terms of coverage
of the model in practice, i.e., our model against the NVD. Finally, as a side
contribution, we demonstrate that XML database technology is mature enough
to interactively analyse XML data like the NVD database using XQuery [13]
directly on an XML database, the MonetDB/XQuery system [14] in particular.
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1.2 Report organisation
After discussing related work in Section 2, we first provide in Section 3 a brief
introduction about three NIST initiatives relevant for the remainder of the re-
port.
The report is divided into two parts and is organized very much as a design
problem guided by the requirements given in the previous section. Part I deals
with the composition of vulnerabilities. We present an initial model for vulnera-
bilities in Section 4, i.e. we propose a set of criteria for classifying vulnerabilities
in large scale. In Section 5, we define rules for compromise i.e. for escalation
of privilege and for moving from one host to another. Part II deals with the
processing and analysis of the data source, i.e. the NIST/NVD, mainly focusing
on finding associations between the database attributes and on the distribution
of CVEs among classes. This stage is reported in Sections 6 and 7. Section 7.4
summarizes what has been uncovered from the analysis. Finally, in Section 8, we
reflect the findings from the database analysis over the composition model, pre-
sented in Section 5, and draw overall conclusions in Section 9. Along Sections 4
to 7 we highlight some hypotheses to be validated with the NVD and draw some
conclusions based on evidence found.
2 Related work
As detailed in Section 1.2, this report can be split in two parts, and consequently
its related work can also be split in two: one refers to the composition of vulner-
abilities and is related to the research areas of Attack Graph and IDS (Intrusion
Detection System) alert correlation. The other refers to knowledge discovery in
vulnerability databases.
Not many commercial tools provide some sort of correlation among network
vulnerabilities. Skybox and Amenaza provide such tools although it is not clear
which rules for vulnerability composition they use [15,16]. In the literature, the
main approach used to compose vulnerabilities and alerts in attack scenarios
relies on detailed sets of pre- and post-conditions. These conditions are analyzed
manually and usually involve details about network and host configurations as
well as attackers’ resources and capabilities which must hold as pre-conditions,
and resulting network and attacker states after an attack step has happened as
post-conditions. This approach is labor intensive and, therefore, often not scal-
able [16]. The next three examples from the Attack Graph community illustrate
this approach.
Sheyner and Wing [17] model atomic attacks using intruders’ pre-conditions
such as his level of privilege in both source and target hosts, and network pre-
conditions such as specific services running on the target host and reachability
from source to target hosts through specific TCP/UDP ports. Intruders’ and
network effects refer to privilege acquired by the intruder on the target machine
and changes in services running, for example. They compose attack scenarios
using a symbolic model checker. Each state transition corresponds to an atomic
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attack where pre-conditions in the source state are satisfied and post-conditions
in the target state hold.
Phillips and Swiler [18] model attack templates based on information related
to nodes, representing states of an attack, and edges, representing actions, events
and/or conditions that must hold for the attack to happen. The initial state of
the network is retrieved from a detailed configuration file. The initial capabili-
ties of the attacker are obtained from an attacker profile which can distinguish
e.g. novice from expert attackers, used to calculate attack probability, and can
enumerate attackers’ capabilities in terms of e.g. possession of automated toolkit
or sniffer. Nodes require several sets of information such as user level, machine
(variable which can be instantiated by one or a group of machines), vulnera-
bilities, capabilities (these last two can overwrite the configuration file and the
attacker profile), and state which indicates stepwise progress of the attack. At-
tack scenarios are composed when edge conditions are satisfied permitting the
transition from one attack state to the next.
Ou et al. [9] model exploit rules using a logic approach based on Datalog, a
subset of Prolog. These rules represent attack steps, e.g. [9, Page 5] “fullCon-
trol(P,H,UserPriv) indicates that principal P can execute arbitrary code with
privilege UserPriv on machine H”, which are specified in the form of if-then
rules. These rules can be included as the if-part of other rules, composing then
attack scenarios to be evaluated by the logical engine. They reported to have
80 exploit rules in their MulVAL framework, in addition to rules which specify
host and network configuration, principal and policies. In more recent work [19],
they apply their approach to a logical attack graph which uses derived nodes,
derived facts and primitive facts.
Several other frameworks follow the detailed pre- and post-conditions ap-
proach to compose attack scenarios [17,18,9,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28]. For yet
further works, refer to Lippmann and Ingols’s review [16].
An alternative approach to compose attack steps relies on simplified pre-
and post-conditions. Lippmann et al. [10,12] use a straightforward way to model
attacker actions and vulnerabilities. The latter are classified based on a set of
two localities (remote and local) and a set of four effects (administrator, user,
other, DoS2). The former are determined by the vulnerability model and reach-
ability between hosts. Their vulnerability database is populated by information
retrieved from Nessus scanning tool [6] and from publicly available databases [7].
Our approach for the composition of vulnerabilities in attack scenarios is derived
from theirs. We study the NVD [7] to gain insight, check some hypotheses, and
validate our model. E.g. Lippmann et al. [12, Page 11] mention that “the admin-
istrator privilege category can be indicated by phrases including execute arbitrary
code”; this was not confirmed by our analysis of the NVD. Additionally, they
consider in their models an effect “other”[10, Page 5] interpreted as related to
confidentiality and integrity loss. The NVD also contains a privilege “other” and
our analysis revealed the impact configurations related to it.
2 Denial of Services
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Knowledge discovery in vulnerability databases has been approached mainly
for reasoning about timing, such as the following three examples. Arora et al. [29]
empirically analysed the impact on the tendency of: (i) vendors in releasing
patches, and (ii) attackers in exploiting vulnerabilities, based on data from an
older version of the NVD (called ICAT Metabase) and other databases like the
Bugtraq [30]. Frei et al. [11] examined the NVD and the osvdb [31] with the
aim of finding trends and quantifying the performance of security (in global
terms) by means of the gap between vulnerability discovery and patch release.
Beattie et al. [32] used the NVD database to gather data about patch release and
subsequent revisions due to faulty patches to reason about the practical problem:
“when to patch?”. Apart from timing, however, only a few researchers studied
associations between attributes from vulnerability databases. Tierney [33] used
ICAT and detected e.g. that “low severity items [vulnerabilities] are associated
with loss of confidentiality”. He also applied the mined rules to classify new
example vulnerabilities. Although relevant, he did not invest in understanding of
interesting attributes like privilege. Schumacher et al. [34] did not provide results
which could increase understanding of vulnerability databases. Lippmann[10]
used the NVD and vulnerabilities reported by the Nessus scanning tool[6] to
manually classify locality and effect of a training set which was later used to
classify vulnerabilities reported by Nessus.
3 NIST initiatives: NVD, CVE and CVSS
The NIST [8], sponsored by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, has
launched several initiatives towards interoperability of information related to
computer security vulnerabilities. Three of such initiatives are the NVD, CVE
and CVSS.
The NVD [7] is a comprehensive repository of vulnerabilities freely available
to the public. It is in its second version and currently in XML format. It collects
vulnerabilities in COTS (Commercial Off-the-Shelf) software since 1999.
CVE [1] (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures 3) is a naming scheme
assigned to known vulnerabilities identified by the community. It is managed by
Mitre (www.mitre.org) and is adopted by many CVE-compatible security products
and services avoiding the problem of several identifiers for the same vulnerability.
CVE identifiers (CVEs for short) are assigned by a CVE Editorial Board and
have the format: CVE-yyyy-xxxx, where yyyy is the year when the vulnerability
was discovered and xxxx is a sequential number.
The CVSS (Common Vulnerability Scoring System) 4 is an effort to provide
an universal vendor-independent score of known vulnerabilities. The CVSS scor-
ing system is in its second version since launched in 2004 and has already been
3 exposure [1] is “a system configuration issue or a mistake in software that allows
access to information or capabilities that can be used by a hacker as a stepping-
stone into a system or network”.
4 The CVSS is maintained by FIRST (Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams
- www.first.org).
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adopted by generic security bulletins such as Bugtraq [30] and osvdb [31], by
vendor-specific bulletins such as from IBM, HP and Cisco, by scanning tools (see
e.g. [15] for a list of tools which report in terms of CVE and CVSS) , and by
intrusion detection and prevention tools.
The CVSS score, a decimal number on a scale 0.0-10.0, is composed of three
metric groups: base, temporal, and environmental. The “base metric group”
quantifies the intrinsic characteristics of a vulnerability in terms of two sub-
scores: (i) exploitability subscore, composed of access vector “AV” (type of access
required in terms of Local, Adjacent network or Network), access complexity
“AC” (level of specialisation required for access in terms of High, Medium or
Low), and authentication “Au” (number of authentication instances required
once the target has been accessed in terms of None, Single or Multiple), and (ii)
potential impact subscore to confidentiality (C), integrity (I) and availability (A)
which the exploitation of the vulnerability can cause in terms of None, Partial
or Complete.
Experts (from NIST) analyze each CVE and assign qualitative values for each
of those attributes. Then, the CVSS system calculates the subscores. The config-
uration “Network” for access, “Low” for complexity and “None” for authentica-
tion returns the highest exploitability subscore, i.e. 10.0. Similarly, “Complete”
impact for Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability returns the highest impact
subscore, also 10.0.
Each CVE reports: (i) the base score, (ii) the exploitability and impact sub-
scores and (iii) the base vector from which the base score has been derived. For
example, CVE-1999-0196 has base vector: (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N),
Exploitability subscore: 10.0 and Impact subscore: 2.9. The other metric groups,
i.e. temporal and environmental, are context-dependent and therefore are not
included in the database. Refer to the CVSS Complete Guide [35] for the base
equation and for details about the transformation of attributes from qualitative
to quantitative.
In the next section, we detail our initial vulnerability and composition mod-
els.
4 Vulnerability model
Our vulnerability model comprises two criteria and is based on the vulnerability
classification provided by Lippmann et al. [10,12]. Similar to them, we represent
vulnerabilities 5 in terms of “access-to-effect”. Our attacker model is based on
the worst-case scenario: attackers know about the existence of all CVEs present
in the network and will exploit them successfully, benefiting from their effect, if
access is available.
– access: access required to exploit a CVE
• network means a CVE in host h1 can be exploited from another reachable
host h2
5 terms “vulnerability” and “CVE” are used interchangeably
Technical Report TR-CTIT-08-08
• local means a CVE in host h1 can be exploited only from host h1
– effect: effect resulting from exploiting a CVE
• user means an attacker gains user access to the vulnerable host
• admin means an attacker gains privileged access (e.g. root in Unix-based
hosts and administrator in Windows-based hosts) to the vulnerable host
• runCode means an attacker gains the ability to execute arbitrary code
on the vulnerable host
• obtainCred means an attacker gains the ability to obtain credentials for
the vulnerable host
• DoS means an attacker gains the ability to make the vulnerable host
unavailable for its legitimate users
Apart from access, credentials may also be required to exploit a CVE. If
credentials are required to fully exploit a CVE, it means that this vulnerability
should be preceded by a CVE of the type {network,local}-to-obtainCred 6.
Hyphothesis 1: The set of CVEs which allow obtaining credentials is sig-
nificant (i.e. at least 5% of CVEs) and can be detected automatically using clues
from their descriptions.
Other prerequisites such as software installed, and operating system running
on a host with respective versions are not part of the model, since we assume
they have already been taken into account on the vulnerability scanning process,
by e.g. Nessus [6] tool.
In the next section, we describe our composition model for attack scenarios.
5 Composition model
We consider that a random attacker can build attack scenarios by compromising
one host after another, until a target is reached. Therefore, an attacker can
move from a host h1 to a host h2 if (i) h2 is reachable from h1, (ii) h1 is
compromised, according to the rules of compromise enumerated in Section 5.1,
and (iii) there is at least one CVE of the following type in h2: network-to-
{user,admin,DoS,runCode,obtainCred}.
5.1 Rules of compromise
A host is considered compromised if an attacker reached “admin” privilege in a
host. An attacker A can comprise a host through one of the following rules of
compromise.
Rule 1 A exploited a network-to-{admin,runCode,DoS} CVE.
Rule 2 A exploited a network-to-user CVE, then a local-to-{admin,runCode,DoS}
CVE which does not require credentials.
Rule 3 A exploited a network-to-user, then a local-to-obtainCred followed by a
local-to-admin CVE which requires credentials.
6 Curly brackets indicate alternatives.
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Rule 4 A exploited a network-to-obtainCred followed by a local-to-admin CVE
which requires credentials.
Hyphothesis 2: Exploiting a runCode or DoS CVE implies on “admin”
level of privilege in at least 90% of the cases.
6 Processing the NVD
The NVD database7 contains 27,909 CVE entries scattered among XML files
corresponding to vulnerabilities created between 1999 and 2007. We skipped the
entries from the database that were marked “** REJECT **” and those that
were not yet analysed (407 entries had just a description). The final number of
vulnerability entries used in this research is 27,273.
The XML files were loaded into the XML database. Because this research
was also used as a case study for demonstrating the maturity of XML database
technology for performing statistical analyses like this, directly on the XML data,
we processed the XML data in two ways:
– Main process
The data was converted to CSV (Comma-Separated Value) using XQuery.
This conversion applied the transformations described in Table 1. For anal-
ysis we used Python scripts [36] and the Weka mining tool [37].
– Case study process
To mimick the process, a similar transformation query was constructed to
produce not CSV, but an XML document containing the same attributes,
transformations and selections, which was then queried.
6.1 Data set attributes
Table 1 contains the list of attributes we have in the data set. Column “NVD
source” describes the XML tags from the original NVD XML database, and
columns “description” and “preprocessing” describe the content of the attributes
and further transformations applied to them8.
7 Analysing the NVD
We use the following methodology to extract knowledge and derive conclusions
from the NVD.
– Analysis of single attributes using the complete CSV data set (see Sec-
tion 7.1).
– Analysis of relations between attributes, driven by the composition model
presented in Section 5, using the complete CSV data set (see Section 7.2).
– Analysis of specific aspects using reduced data sets (see Section 7.3).
7 We downloaded the XML files on 08/11/2007.
8 Except by the exploitability (cvss exploit) and impact (cvss impact) subscores, all
attributes used were nominal.
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att. names NVD source description preprocessing & content
name entry → name CVE identi-
fier
none
cvss AC entry → CVSS vector access com-
plexity
no processing; possible values: L (low), M
(medium) or H (high) (refer to Section 3 for
information about the CVSS vector, i.e. at-
tributes and possible content.)
cvss AV entry → CVSS vector access vector no processing; possible values: N (network), L
(local) or A (adjacent network)
cvss Au entry → CVSS vector authentication
required
no processing; possible values: N (none), S
(single) or M (multiple)
cvss C entry → CVSS vector impact on
confidential-
ity
no processing; possible values: N (none), P
(partial) or C (complete)
cvss I entry → CVSS vector impact on in-
tegrity
no processing; same values as for cvss C
cvss A entry → CVSS vector impact on
availability
no processing; same values as for cvss C
cvss exploit entry →
→ CVSS exploit subscore
exploitability
subscore
no processing; possible values from 0.0 to 10.0
cvss impact entry →
→ CVSS impact subscore
impact sub-
score
no processing; same values as for cvss exploit
privilege entry → loss types
→ sec prot
privilege ac-
quired by
exploiting the
vulnerability
can contain a single privilege such as “ad-
min”, ”user”, ”other”, can be empty (i.e. have
no privilege assigned), or can contain multi-
ple privileges. In this last case, a unique priv-
ilege was derived as follows: “other,admin”
replaced by “admin”; “other,user” replaced
by “user”; “user,admin” replaced by “admin”;
“other,user,admin” replaced by “admin”
type vuln entry → vuln types type of vul-
nerability
can contain single types such as “input”, “ac-
cess”, “design”, “config”, “race”, “env”, “ex-
ception”, “other”, can be empty, or can con-
tain multiple types; in this last case, we re-
placed the list of types by “multiple”
runCode entry → desc → descript possibility of
running code
“y” if the description contains the following
key expressions: ’execute arbitrary code’ or
’execute arbitrary programs’; “no” otherwise
obtainCred entry → desc → descript possibility
of obtaining
credentials for
authentica-
tion
“y” if the description contains the follow-
ing key expressions: ’intercept transmission’,
’intercept communication’, ’obtain plaintext’,
’obtain cleartext’, ’read network traffic’, ’un-
encrypted’ or ’sniff’; “no” otherwise
gainAdmin entry → desc → descript possibility to
gain admin
level of access
“y” if the description contains the following
key expressions: ’gain root’ or ’gain access to
root’; “no” otherwise
DoS entry → desc → descript possibility to
cause a denial
of service in
the host
“y” if the description contains the following
key expression: ’denial of service’; “no” other-
wise
Fig. 1. CSV data set attributes
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import module namespace mstat = "..." at ".../modstat.xq";
let $cves := doc("nvdcve.xml")//cvss
return <result>{ mstat:value-distribution($cves,"cvss AV")
,mstat:value-distribution($cves,"cvss AC")
,mstat:value-distribution($cves,"cvss Au")
,mstat:value-distribution($cves,"privilege")
}</result>
Fig. 2. Example XQuery reproducing Table 4(a) directly from NVD XML data
Separately, the same evaluation of the data set was performed using XQuery
queries directly on the data in the XML database. For each table in this report,
a query was written to reproduce the numbers in the table (see Figure 2 for an
example). We tried to generalize on the kinds of analyses done by constructing
generic domain-independent functions. For example, the query in Figure 2 uses
mstat:value-distribution, which calculates the distribution of values for a
given child of a sequence of elements. We evaluate our experiences with using
XML database technology in this way by looking at the sizes of the queries,
whether the queries run in interactive time on an ordinary PC9, and the mistakes
made along the way.
Table 3 contains the impact configurations found among the data set along
the analysis process. Refer to Table 1 for attribute names and possible contents.
For example, cvss C=C means complete impact on confidentiality.
CIA impact NVD attributes configuration
Complete CIA cvss C=C and cvss I=C and cvss A=C
Partial CIA cvss C=P and cvss I=P and cvss A=P
No CIA cvss C=N and cvss I=N and cvss A=N
Only-C (cvss C=C or cvss C=P) and cvss I=N and cvss A=N
Only-I cvss C=N and (cvss I=C or cvss I=P) and cvss A=N
Only-A cvss C=N and cvss I=N and (cvss A=C or cvss A=P)
C & I (cvss C=C or cvss C=P) and (cvss I=C or cvss I=P) and cvss A=N
A & C (cvss C=C or cvss C=P) and cvss I=N and (cvss A=C or cvss A=P)
A & I cvss C=N and (cvss I=C or cvss I=P) and (cvss A=C or cvss A=P)
Fig. 3. Configurations of impact on CIA
7.1 Analysis of single attributes
The total number of CVEs in the data set used in this section is 27,273. Ta-
ble 4(a) shows the distribution of CVEs in terms of access required for their
exploitation. It demonstrates that the vast majority of CVEs require local ac-
cess to the vulnerable host.
9 We used a laptop with an Intel Pentium M (1.86GHz) and 1GB of main memory.
The version of MonetDB/XQuery used is 0.22.
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exploitability #CVEs
access
network 22885 83.9%
local 4329 15.9%
adjacent
network
59 0.2%
complexity
low 20762 76.1%
medium 4824 17.7%
high 1687 6.2%
authenti-
cation
none 26480 97.1%
single 787 2.9%
multiple 6 0.02%
privilege #CVEs
admin 3462 12.7%
user 2233 8.2%
other 7292 26.7%
no privilege 14286 52.4%
(a) Exploitability and privilege
impact #CVEs
confidentiality
none 8168 29.9%
partial 14646 53.7%
complete 4459 16.3%
integrity
none 7344 26.9%
partial 15635 57.3%
complete 4294 15.7%
availability
none 7890 28.9%
partial 14429 52.9%
complete 4954 18.2%
clues #CVEs
gainAdmin
yes 406 1.5%
no 26867 98.5%
runCode
yes 3839 14.1%
no 23434 85.9%
obtainCred
yes 131 0.5%
no 27142 99.5%
DoS
yes 4933 18.1%
no 22340 81.9%
(b) Impact and clues from description
Fig. 4. Distribution of CVEs by single attributes
admin (12.7%)
user (8.2%)other (26.7%)
no privilege (52.4%)
Distribution of CVEs in the NVD on 08/11/2007
Fig. 5. Initial distribution of CVEs by privi-
lege
Figure 5 illustrates the ini-
tial distribution of CVEs based
on privilege acquired by ex-
ploiting them, according to Ta-
ble 4(a). This distribution is
interesting because it demon-
strates that almost 80% of the
CVEs (privilege “other” and no
privilege) are not clearly classi-
fied in terms of resulting priv-
ilege for the attacker. This is a
good opportunity for further in-
vestigation.
Table 4(a) also shows the distribution of complexity level for exploiting CVEs
and the distribution of authentication required for exploiting them. Results for
the former demonstrate that only 6.2% of CVEs involve a “high” level of com-
plexity to be exploited. Results for the latter demonstrate that 97.1% of CVEs
require no credentials to be exploited. This is more or less confirmed by the fact
that 93.8% of CVEs involve “low” or “medium” levels of complexity since the
need for authentication, at least in part, increases the level of complexity for
exploitation. Table 4(b) shows the number of CVEs in terms of level of impact
caused on the exploited host. What seems curious about this table is the simi-
larity among the numbers.
Hyphothesis 3: Impact on C, I and A usually match. It means e.g. that
when a vulnerability causes partial impact of confidentiality, it also causes par-
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impact admin user other no privilege
only-C 0 0 0 3232
only-I 0 0 0 3931
only-A 0 0 0 3965
complete CIA 3462 0 0 787
unknown CIA configuration 0 2233 7292 2371
total 3462 2233 7292 14286
Fig. 6. Distribution of CVE by privilege against type of impact
tial impact on integrity and availability.
Table 4(b) also shows some effects resulting from the exploitation of CVEs
we would like to get insights about. First the table demonstrates that there
are 406 CVEs of the type “gainAdmin”. However, we have seen in Table 4(a)
that 3462 CVE result in “admin” privilege. A next step is to investigate if the
“gainAdmin” set is a subset of the “admin” set or not. If confirmed, this last
set can be simply ignored. If not confirmed, the “admin” set can be enlarged
with elements from the “gainAdmin” set. We perform this analysis in the next
section.
Conclusion 1: Hypothesis 1 is not confirmed in practice since only 0.5%
(Table 4(b)) of CVEs allow obtaining credentials, according to clues derived
from their descriptions.
We examine attributes together in the next section.
7.2 Analysis of relations between attributes
The complete data set, containing 27,273 CVE, is now used for the analysis of
multiple attributes. Table 6 shows the distribution of CVEs in terms of privilege
against type of impact.
This distribution leads us to the following remarks and to Conclusions 2 and
3.
– All CVEs classified with privilege “admin” have complete impact on CIA.
– The set of CVEs with no privilege can be split into four subsets containing
specific impact configurations: only-C, only-I, only-A, and complete CIA
(refer to Table 3).
Conclusion 2: The set of CVEs with no privilege but complete CIA impact
(787 CVEs) can be reclassified with privilege “admin”.
Conclusion 3: The set of CVEs with no privilege contains three significant
(i.e. at least 5% of CVEs) subsets: only-C, only-I and only-A.
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impact admin user other no
privilege
only-C 0 0 0 1
only-I 0 0 0 2
only-A 0 0 0 1
complete CIA 395 0 0 1
(a) CVEs with gainAdmin clue
gainAdmin:
406
“no privilege”
but complete
impact CIA:
787
admin:
3462 395  1
(b) Sets of admin-related CVEs
Fig. 7. Figuring out reclassification of “admin”
If we consider Tables 4(b), 6 and 7(a), we realise there are two overlaps
between CVE which contain clues of root privilege (gainAdmin = y) with (i)
CVEs classified as “admin” and with (ii) CVEs with no privilege but which result
in complete CIA impact, as illustrated in Figure 7(b). Thus, from a total of 406
CVEs with gainAdmin, 395 overlap with the former set and 1 overlaps with the
latter set, resulting in 10 CVEs (406 − 395 − 1) which can be reclassified as
“admin”. These are outliers because they do not imply complete CIA impact10.
The resulting distribution of CVEs in terms of privilege is shown in Figure 8.
Conclusion 4: There are 10 CVEs which can also be reclassified with
privilege “admin” based on clues derived from their descriptions.
admin (15.6%)
user (8.2%)
other (26.7%)
no privilege (49.5%)
Distribution of CVEs re−classified
Fig. 8. Distribution of CVEs after “admin”
reclassification
Based on conclusions 2 and 4,
we reclassified 797 CVEs as “ad-
min”. Most of them had no privi-
lege.
We proceed with the analysis
by looking at the distribution of
CVEs in terms of resulting privi-
lege and impact against access re-
quired for their exploitation (see
Table 9).
The following remarks can
be drawn from this table: (i)
23.7% of CVEs can be classi-
fied under the following access-to-
effect: network-to-admin (9.8%),
network-to-user (6.8%), local-to-
admin (5.8%) and local-to-user (1.3%), while 76.3%, including privilege “other”
and no privilege, remains with unclear effect; (ii) no conclusions can be drawn
for the access “adjacent network”, since it covers several sets of privilege and
impact. It will be investigated in the next section. However, it is interesting to
10 Outliers: CVE-1999-0132, CVE-1999-0133, CVE-1999-0333, CVE-1999-0706, CVE-
2000-0163, CVE-2000-0224, CVE-2000-0901, CVE-2003-0261, CVE-2005-3269, and
CVE-2005-3784.
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privilege impact network local adjacent
network
total
reclassified admin 2676 1574 9 4259
user 1857 366 6 2229
other 6724 558 8 7290
no
privilege
only-C 2725 502 4 3231
only-I 3517 411 1 3929
only-A 3387 553 24 3964
unknown CIA con-
figurations
1999 365 7 2371
total 22885 4329 59 27273
Fig. 9. Privilege and type of impact against access required to exploit CVEs
observe that 40.7% of these are related to CVEs with only-A impact. This issue
is examined in the next section.
We looked next at all classes of CVEs identified so far (with reclassified
admin) from the perspective of runCode and DoS clues gathered from CVEs’
descriptions, as defined in Table 1. Table 12 shows the resulting distribution.
impact user other no
privilege
total
partial CIA 2229 7290 1340 10859
no CIA 0 0 59 59
A & I 0 0 213 213
A & C 0 0 88 88
C & I 0 0 668 668
total 2229 7290 2368 2368
Fig. 11. Understanding isolated CVEs
with partial CIA impact
The total of CVEs which causes
DoS in Table 12 matches the to-
tal presented in Table 4(b). How-
ever, there is a difference of one
CVE between these two tables in
respect to runCode. It refers to the
outlier CVE-2007-4060 which does
not match any of the classes identi-
fied, since it has impact cvss C=P,
cvss I=P and cvss A=C. As ex-
pected intuitively, DoS does impact
heavily on availability, thus 3695 out of 3964 (93.2%) of only-A CVEs cause DoS.
Intriguing are the 112 CVEs classified as runCode but which cause only-A im-
pact, shouldn’t they be classified as DoS? In fact, as shown by the last column
of Table 12, there is an overlap of 98 CVEs between CVEs which cause only-A
impact but belong to both DoS and runCode sets. It indicates that these CVEs
cause DoS by (probably automatic) code execution, except for 0.4% of the cases,
i.e. 14 out of 3709 (= 3695 + 112 − 98). We refer, from now on, to both sets of
Dos and only-A interchangeably.
CVEs which allow to run code, however, impact mostly on all three aspects
of security, i.e. on C, I and A. Roughly, “runCode” either impact CIA completely
(33.8%) or partially (60.5%). Excluding CVEs with admin privilege, 91.4% (2324
out of 2542) of CVEs which result in runCode cause partial CIA impact. It
suggests that the set of runCode CVEs is a subset of the partial CIA set, with
a representation of 21% (2324 out of 10859).
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Conclusion 5: Among CVEs with privilege “user”, “other” and without
privilege, there are two sets of CVEs: DoS and runCode. The former and
the set of only-A impact CVEs will be addressed interchageably because of
high degree of overlap between them. The latter is a subset of the partial
CIA set.
Conclusion 6: Hypothesis 2 is not confirmed since only 33.7% (1296/3839)
of runCode CVEs and 7.3% (359/4933) of DoS CVEs result in “admin”
privilege.
A natural next step is to narrow down the investigation to understand which
CIA configurations there are in the set of CVEs with privilege “other”, “user”
and without privilege (curiosity triggered by Table 6). Weka [37] visualization
facilities provided clues for this next step, as illustrated in Figure 10. This figure
shows that, although CVEs without privilege have varied impact on confidential-
ity (C) 10(a), integrity (I) 10(b) and availability (A) 10(c), demonstrated by the
fact that the first column of these three plots have three segments corresponding
to C (complete), N (none), P (partial), CVEs with privilege “other” and “user”
have only partial impact on C, I and A. Table 11 confirms that, and shows the
complete set of CIA impact configurations present in the set of CVEs with no
privilege. It leads us to Conclusions 7 and 8.
Conclusion 7: The set of “user” and “other” is composed of CVEs that
always result in partial CIA impact. There is a subset of CVEs with no
privilege which also causes partial CIA impact, and another which causes
no CIA impact. Adding to this, we have seen a significant set of CVEs
resulting in complete CIA impact. Hence, hypothesis 3 is confirmed since,
for 55.8% of CVEs, confidentiality, integrity and availability match.
From this conclusion, a natural question to ask is: “which criteria distinguish
CVEs classified as “user”, “other”, and the subset of CVEs without privilege
but with partial CIA impact?”. This will be investigated in the next section.
Furthermore, the group of 59 CVEs which result in no impact at all on CIA is
puzzling. We also examine this in the next section.
Conclusion 8: Apart from 3 outliers, the set of CVEs with no privilege
(13,495) contains the following impact subsets: (from Table 9 and 11): (i)
only-C, (ii) only-I, (iii) only-A, (iv) partial CIA, (v) no CIA, (vi) A & I,
(vii) A & C, and (viii) C & I (i.e. it contains 8 out of 9 subsets identified
during the whole analysis process, see Table 3).
The outliers are CVE-2007-3266 has impact: A=P C=C I=P, CVE-2007-
3949 has impact: A=C C=P I=P, and CVE-2007-4060 has impact: A=C C=P
I=P.
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7.3 Analysis of specific aspects
privilege impact DoS runCode overlap
re-class.
admin
359 1296 206
user partial CIA 332 1292 278
other partial CIA 295 834 218
no
privilege
partial CIA 113 198 38
only-C 6 3 0
only-I 9 49 1
only-A 3695 112 98
A & I 58 32 16
A & C 63 4 3
C & I 1 17 0
no CIA 2 1 1
total 4933 3838 859
Fig. 12. Distribution of CVEs in terms of DoS
and runCode
In this section, we zoom into the
data set to try understanding
CVEs with no impact, CVEs
with “adjacent network” access,
and to find insights which could
distinguish CVEs with partial
CIA impact among privilege in
terms of exploitability and type
of vulnerability.
We learnt, by manual ana-
lyzes of the set of CVEs with no
CIA impact, that:
– 69.5% refer to warning, e.g.
“The Telnet service is run-
ning”, “A component ser-
vice related to NIS is running”, “Anonymous FTP is enabled”, “A hacker
utility, backdoor or Trojan Horse is installed” (they are all classified with
“network” access and complexity “low”)
– 22% refer to CVEs with unknown impact and access vector, e.g CVE-2005-
222
– 8.5% refer to misclassified CVEs, e.g. CVE-2007-4526: “...allows local users
to obtain sensitive information...”, CVE-2007-3801: “...allows remote attack-
ers to cause Denial of Services...”
As a remark, it is interesting to notice that, although warning CVEs are all
classified with complexity “low”, they involve in reality no complexity at all.
Further investigation of the set of CVEs with “adjacent network” access
revealed that they refer to vulnerabilities related to e.g. wireless network using
technology like Bluetooth, and printer drivers. Additionally, 90% (53 out of 59)
of them cause some degree of availability impact (considering the partial CIA,
complete CIA and only-A sets), although no more than half contain DoS clues
in their description.
We then isolated the set of CVEs that result in partial CIA impact, i.e.
10,859 CVEs from privilege “user”, “other” and without privilege for further
analysis (refer to Table 11). We used Weka [37] to find associations among
the nominal attributes: access (cvss AV), complexity (cvss AC), authentication
(cvss Au), confidentiality (cvss C), integrity (cvss I), availability (cvss A), priv-
ilege, vulnerability type (vuln type) (see Table 1 for more details).
The Predictive Apriori algorithm returned 100 association rules among these
attributes. Figure 13 shows the first 30 rules with higher accuracy rate (acc).
Analysing these associations we see that, in fact, the rules relate exploitability
(i.e. attributes cvss AV, cvss AC, cvss Au), privilege, and type of vulnerability,
since impact on C, I and A are the same (=partial) among all CVEs isolated.
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The associations predicted can be summarized in terms of exploitability sub-
scores, by applying the exploitability attributes to the CVSS scoring system [35],
while maintaining impact attributes constant (see Table 1):
– Exploitability 10.0, 8.6, and 4.9 correspond to cvss AV=N, cvss AC=L,M,H,
cvss Au=N; 86.8% of CVEs have this exploitability configuration.
– Exploitability 3.9, 3.4, and 1.9 correspond to cvss AV=L, cvss AC=L,M,H,
cvss Au=N; 10.3% of CVEs have this exploitability configuration.
– Exploitability 8.0, 6.8, and 3.9 correspond to cvss AV=N, cvss AC=L,M,H,
cvss Au=S; 2.4% 11 of CVEs have this exploitability configuration.
Figure 14(a) shows the distribution of the isolated CVEs in terms of ex-
ploitability. No new visible insights towards distinguishing the isolated CVEs
per privilege could be identified from this analysis. Nevertheless, the plot con-
firms that the majority of CVEs are easily exploitable, since they can be ex-
ploited remotely (through network access), involves low complexity and requires
no authentication.
Figure 14(b) shows the distribution of the isolated CVEs in terms of types of
vulnerability 12. It makes evident that the type “input”, i.e. buffer overflow and
boundary condition errors, dominates by far the isolated CVEs. In fact, 82.8% of
the total number of CVEs with partial CIA impact result from “input” (66.5%),
“access” (5.2%) and “design” (11.1%) flaws.
The insights obtained in terms of exploitability and types of vulnerability
among the isolated CVEs triggered our curiosity towards what happens among
CVEs with only-C, only-I and only-A impact. Table 15 shows the results and
suggests Conclusions 9 and 10.
Conclusion 9: While exploiting only-C and only-A CVEs typically (90%+)
involve low complexity, exploiting only-I CVEs involve low complexity in
only 33.3% but high complex in 57.5% of the cases.
Conclusion 10: Similar to what happens with CVEs with partial CIA
impact, 70.4% of only-I CVEs relate to “input” flaws. However, the same
does not happen with only-C and only-A CVEs, where only 33% and 32.5%
respectively, relate to “input” flaws.
The knowledge acquired troughout the analysis is summarized in the next
section.
7.4 Summary of insights from the NVD analysis
A summary of conclusions reachead along the analysis of the NVD repository
are enumerated next.
11 Included here 15 out of 1048 CVEs (1.4%) with exploitability 3.9 corresponding to
cvss AV=N, cvss AC=H, cvss Au=N.
12 We grouped in oth. the following: multiple types of vulnerability for the CVE, type
equal to “other” and empty type.
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1. Six predominant classes of CVEs were identified, some have explicit effect
on impact, i.e. partial CIA, only-I and only-C and others have implicit effect
on impact, i.e. admin, DoS and runCode.
2. Admin level of privilege imply in complete CIA impact. However, 10 outliers,
i.e. with no complete CIA impact, were identified which explicitely contained
in their description the expression “gain root”.
3. Two significant sets of DoS and runCode were identified among CVEs with
“user”, “other” and with no privilege. However, we found that they overlap
by 9.2%. This overlap is explained by the fact that the ability to run code
is a way used for automated DoS attacks. Nevertheless, there is a clear cut
between these sets: DoS imply mostly on only-A while runCode is more
generic and results mostly on either complete CIA or partial CIA impact.
4. A significant group of only-I impact was detected among CVEs with no
privilege. Almost 60% of CVEs in this set involve high complexity for ex-
ploitation and 70% are exploited by “input” attacks, i.e. buffer overflow and
boundary errors.
5. An also significant set of only-C CVEs was detected among CVEs with no
privilege. These CVEs are typically easily exploitable, i.e. require network
access, low complexity and no authentication, and 13 of them derive from
“input” flaws and amost another 13 derive from “design” flaws.
6. 100% of CVEs with privilege “user” and “other” cause partial CIA impact.
The set of CVEs with no privilege also contains a subset of partial CIA
impact. We found that 86.8% of these require network access and no au-
thentication although involve a varied levels of complexity for exploitation.
However, although easily exploitabable and the fact that 82.8% of these
CVEs are related to input, access and design flaws, no conclusive factor was
detected to distinguish this set in terms of privilege.
7. Other clusters without significant representation were also detected among
CVEs with no privilege. They are: no CIA impact, A & C, A & I and C &
I (refer to Table 3).
8. The set of CVEs which cause no CIA impact are mostly (69%) composed of
warnings. They either refer to services running which allow attackers to get
context information such as day/time, valid users and environment variables,
or to services which can establish, if enabled, a relationship of trust between
two hosts, e.g. SSH, Telnet or FTP connections.
Based on these conclusions, two slightly different views of CVEs can be de-
rived: an effect-view and an impact-view. The former is a mixture of implicit and
explicit effects. The latter is a purely impact-driven view. Figure 16 illustrates
both views (sets which represent less than 5% of CVEs were included in the pies
as “remaining”).
In the next section, we reflect both views on our initial vulnerability and
composition models presented in Sections 4 and 5.
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8 Evaluation
We evaluate in this section, the effect-view and the impact-view of CVEs over
our initial vulnerability and composition models, presented in Sections 4 and 5.
Moreover, we evaluate the experiences with using XML database technology for
performing the analyses.
admin 
(15.6%)
DoS (14.5%)
runCode (8.5%)
only−C
(11.8%)
only−I
(14.4%)
partial CIA (31.3%)
remaining
(3.9%)
Distribution of CVEs after analysis − effect view
(a) Effect view
complete CIA 
(15.6%)
only−C (11.8%)
only I (14.4%)
only−A 
(14.5%)
partial CIA (40.0%)
remaining
(3.7%)
Distribution of CVEs after analysis − impact view
(b) Impact view
Fig. 16. Final distribution of CVEs
Since no significant high-
level differences between CVEs
which result in partial CIA im-
pact were spotted, we use the
effect “user”, in the effect view,
to refer to the partial CIA set of
CVEs.
In our initial composition
model we considered only move-
ment between hosts once the
source host was fully compro-
mised, i.e. an attacker had
reached “admin” level on it.
However, warning CVEs (among
CVEs with no CIA impact)
have raised the flag of ser-
vices which establish connec-
tions of trust between hosts. In
this case, if the attacker ob-
tains credentials for a host h1,
such as an user account pass-
word, he can potentially access
a host h2, via the connection,
as the user and then exploit, for
example, any local-to-{admin,
runCode,DoS,only-C,only-I,
partialCIA} CVE. Hence, al-
though per Conclusion 1, only
0.5% of CVEs contain clues in
their descriptions which indi-
cate that they allow attackers to obtain credentials, the effect obtainCred will
be maintained in our reviewed model, not associated with CVEs which require
credentials but with warning CVEs.
In the next two subsections, we present the rules of compromise updated,
according to both views.
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8.1 Reviewed rules of compromise
The effect and impact views do not differ concerning the composition model as
the considerations for moving from a host to another apply for both. An attacker
can move from host h1 to host h2 if:
– (i) h2 is reachable from h1 via a trusted 13 service/interface, (ii) h1 is com-
promised in terms of network-to-obtainCred, and (iii) there is at least one
vulnerability of the type local-to-{admin,runCode,DoS,only-C,only-I} in h2
– (i) h2 is reachable from h1 via a non-trusted service/interface, (ii) h1 is
fully compromised according to the rules of compromise, and (iii) at least
one vulnerability of the type network-to-{admin,runCode,DoS,only-C,only-
I} exists in h2
Next we review the rules for the effect-view, considering an attacker A.
Rule 1 A exploited a network-to-admin CVE.
Rule 2 A exploited one or several network-to-{user,runCode,DoS,only-C,only-I}
CVEs, followed by a local-to-admin CVE.
Similarly, the rules of compromise for the impact-view are:
Rule 1 A exploited a network-to-completeCIA CVE.
Rule 2 A exploited one or several network-to-{partialCIA,only-C,only-I,only-A}
CVEs, followed by a local-to-completeCIA CVE.
The advantage of the impact-view over the effect-view is that the effect-view
has implicit impacts which might not be always straightforward. For example,
it is not evident that the effects runCode and “user” imply partial CIA impact,
as we have revealed in our analysis.
8.2 Evaluation of experiences with using XML database technology
for performing the analyses
To reproduce all tables 4(a) to 16, we defined four generic functions of in total
about 100 lines of XQuery.14 One function determines the distribution of values
in a given child of a sequence of elements. Another function determines corre-
lations between two given children of a sequence of elements. We also defined
generalizations of these that accept an XML fragment containing a class speci-
fication. This is used, for example, to convey what “partial/complete C” means
in terms of conditions on attributes in the data set.Using these functions, the
queries need on average a mere 22 lines and all execute in interactive time (within
a few seconds). Another observation that can be made is that these queries are
very simple in nature and all follow the same design pattern.
13 We consider as trusted service/interface the type of connections which are considered
as warning CVEs.
14 The source of the queries can be downloaded from
http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~keulen/pub/nvd_cvss_xquery.zip.
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We should note that we did transform the original XML files to one XML doc-
ument structured as a sequence of entries with each attribute of Table 1 as child
element. This proved useful as it simplified the queries. Especially the encoding
of several attributes in one string for CVSS vector in the original NVD XML
files is unsuitable for analysis and it is advisable to split it. The transformation
query contains 75 lines of XQuery.
We observed an important qualitative characteristic favoring the use of XML
database technology. As common in analytical research, some scripts (Python)
were developed for the main process to aid in the analysis. In the XML database
case study there was no need for that as all manipulations could be expressed
in XQuery. Scripting, however, involves manipulation of the data on the syntax
level essentially some parsing and generation of new data. Being able to stay in
the XML domain in the case study appeared to be less error prone, especially
regarding low-level syntactical mistakes with row and field separators and quot-
ing. Such low-level errors are inconceivable when using XML technology, because
it properly handles all syntactical issues, hence protecting the user against such
low-level errors. Moreover, such low-level mistakes may go unnoticed due to the
inherent aggregation in the analysis.
We expect that the scalability properties of XML database technology [14]
allows similar analyses on considerable larger data sets than involved in this
case study. We intend to investigate this expectation. Furthermore, association
rule mining as in Figure 13 was not among the aims for this case study as it
requires special algorithms (Predictive Apriori). We also plan to investigate the
feasibility of enhancing MonetDB/XQuery with support for such algorithms.
Enhancing relational databases in this way is a known approach, see e.g. [38].
9 Conclusion
We analysed the NVD repository with three aims. The first aim was to under-
stand associations between attributes. This analysis has allowed us to revert an
initial state where almost 80% of CVEs (with privilege “other” or with no priv-
ilege), had unclear effect to a state where we know which clusters they contain.
Additionally, we derived from the analysis two views of CVEs related to effect:
one called ”effect view” which is a mixture of explicit effect and impact, and one
called ”impact view” which is purely impact-driven. The impact-view appears
better towards quantitative analysis of impact expected by attack scenarios. The
second aim was to gain insights about our initial vulnerability and composition
models. In this sense we were able to check hypothesis, to verify the coverage
of the models and, in the end, to review them. Furthermore, in respect to our
third aim, we can conclude that XML database technology is mature enough
to carry out such research by writing XQuery queries, which already proved to
be less error prone. As future work, we plan to incorporate insights from the
reviewed composition model into our approach to learn attack scenarios from
network graphs [39].
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Fig. 10. Plots of isolated CVEs: with no privilege (first bar), and with privileges
“other” & “user”
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Fig. 13. First 30 rules returned by Predictive Apriori from Weka [37]
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Exploitability of CVEs with partial impact on CIA
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Type of vulnerability of CVEs with partial impact on CIA
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Fig. 14. Distribution of isolated CVEs (with partial impact on CIA)
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characteristics only-C only-I only-A
access
network 2725 3517 3387
local 502 411 553
adjacent
network
4 1 24
complexity
low 2965 1308 3574
medium 129 360 148
high 137 2261 242
authenti-
cation
none 3145 3841 3877
single 86 88 86
multiple 0 0 1
type vuln
input 1065 2767 1290
access 314 121 39
design 966 426 506
total 3231 3929 3964
Fig. 15. Exploitability & type of vulnerability for only-C, only-I and only-A
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